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by Paul Rogers
There have been many suggestions among media and military analysts
since 2003 of possible parallels between the war in Iraq and the
United States imbroglio in Vietnam that ended so humiliatingly in
1975. The argument is most prominently made by critics of both
wars, though it has also been articulated by defence scholars or
officials concerned that the US learns the "right" lessons from its
costly Vietnam experience.
Three aspects of this approach are
notable, however. First, fewer such comparisons have been made with
the conflict in Afghanistan, which arguably in some respects offers
a closer "fit" with the Vietnam war than does Iraq. Second, the
Vietnam precedent is invoked as if the devastating wars in that
country started only with the significant American involvement in
the mid-1950s and later, and almost completely ignores the earlier,
post-1945 clash of arms between Vietnamese nationalists and French
colonialists. Third, when parallels (whether Iraqi or Afghan) are
drawn, they tend to be presented exclusively from the viewpoint of
the Americans. It is as if "only" the United States (and by
extension western forces or combatants in general) have the
capacity or the interest to draw lessons from the past.
Paul Rogers is professor of peace studies
at Bradford University, northern England. He has been writing a
weekly column on global security on openDemocracy since 26
September 2001
This context makes all the more
interesting a report which cites the view of an (anonymous) Taliban
media source that much of the military activity in Afghanistan in
the coming months will resemble the tactics employed by the
Vietminh guerrillas and their renowned military commander, General
Vo Nguyen Giap, in the war against French control of "Indochina"
(see Syed Saleem Shahzad, "The Taliban talk the talk", Asia Times,
11 April 2008).
The reference is startling and ominous. In
the early 1950s, the Vietminh - faced with an imbalance between
their own forces and conventional French military power -
concentrated on attacking isolated garrisons in the northern part
of Vietnam well away from the main colonial centres of control:
Hanoi, Haiphong and the densely populated Hong (Red) river delta.
This strategy, combined with attacks on French supply-lines,
gradually wore down the French military and political leadership's
resolve.
Now, it seems, the Taliban aim to do the
same against an equivalently "asymmetrical" enemy: Nato, and the
International Security Assistance Force (Isaf) forces in
Afghanistan.
The Taliban shifts gear
The Taliban source highlights the success
of this kind of strategy against Pakistani army units in the border
districts; recent assaults on the key supply-routes delivering
equipment and provisions through Pakistan to Afghanistan also fit
the pattern. The latter have included the destruction on 24 March
of forty petrol-tankers at a border-post, and the detonation on 1
April of a bridge on the Indus highway in Pakistan's North-West
Frontier Province.
Nato's concern with its dependence on the
insecure Pakistan-Afghanistan roads is reflected in its agreement
with Russia (at the Nato summit in Bucharest on 2-4 April) on the
land-transit of "non-lethal supplies" to its troops in Afghanistan.
At the same time, other parts of Nato exhibit a blithe confidence
in the coalition's capacity to counter such Taliban initiatives;
for example the Isaf spokesman Brigadier-General Carlos Branco
dismisses Taliban claims of a new strategy and expresses confidence
in Nato's superior firepower and ability to counter the
movement's initiatives.
Carlos Branco responds to the Vietnam
analogy by comparing Giap's use of coordinated guerrilla and
conventional attacks backed by a range of weaponry, with the far
less effective Taliban campaign. The group, he argues, have little
to show for the last few years; Nato's firepower remains clearly
superior and Taliban claims of a new approach are boasts without
substance.
The director of the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), reporting on a seven-day visit
to Afghanistan, reaches a somewhat different conclusion. Jakob
Kellenberger stated on behalf of his organisation: "We are
extremely concerned about the worsening humanitarian situation in
Afghanistan. There is growing insecurity and a clear
intensification of the armed conflict, which is no longer limited
to the south but has spread to the east and west." He continues:
"The harsh reality is that in large parts of Afghanistan, little
development is taking place. Instead, the conflict is forcing more
and more people from their homes. Their growing humanitarian needs
and those of other vulnerable people must be met as a matter of
urgency."
The ICRC - which has extensive experience
in humanitarian work in Afghanistan, including after many other
NGOs left in response to deteriorating security there - thus
presents a bleaker prognosis than Nato officialdom (see Laura King,
"US troops gird for a spring offensive in Afghanistan", Boston
Globe, 16 April 2008). But in any case, does what is happening in
the country relate at all to the Indochina war of 1945-54 and the
tactics of Vo Nguyen Giap and the Vietminh?
The Dien Bien Phu drama
The Vietminh originated as a unified force
in the face of Japanese occupation in the early 1940s, under the
political leadership of the nationalist-communist leader Ho Chi
Minh. After the Japanese collapse and the end of the war in August
1945, the Vietminh came to control substantial parts of northern
Vietnam; the return of the French in 1946 to reclaim their colonial
lands, however, forced the Vietminh to retreat to rural areas and
attempt to wage war from bases there (see David Marr, Vietnam 1945:
The Quest for Power [University of California Press, 1997]).
In the 1946-50 period the anti-colonial
struggle was small-scale as the Vietminh slowly built its support.
The Vietminh gained an important external sources of arms after the
Chinese Communist Party won the civil war and took control of China
(Vietnam's northern neighbour, as well as its ancient and intimate
rival) on 1 October 1949. In the next four years, the Vietminh
conducted a series of bitterly-fought guerrilla actions which
resulted in their securing control of most of the rural areas in
the north of Vietnam. But the French retained military superiority
and administrative control in the major cities and the densely
populated Hong delta. By 1953, the war was stalemated, though heavy
French casualties were increasing hostility to the war in France
itself.
Most of the fighting had been taking place
during the dry winter seasons, but in 1953-54 Giap attempted to
open up a new front by aiding the Pathet Lao insurgents in
neighbouring Laos. This was potentially disastrous for the
overstretched French, who responded by occupying and reinforcing
the remote town of Dien Bien Phu. The garrison town was
strategically placed to intercept Vietminh supply routes to the
Pathet Lao, but also hundreds of kilometres from other French
positions.
It was a move too far. The French did not
have the resources to supply Dien Bien Phu by air; the Vietminh
controlled the access routes, and mounted an epic effort to
transfer supplies (a huge amount of them by bicycle) across densely
forested and mountainous tracks to encircle and besiege the French
forces. After a bitter siege in which many thousands were killed on
both sides, the French garrison surrendered in early May 1954. The
French may still have controlled Hanoi, Haiphong, Saigon and most
of Indochina, but the devastating defeat at Dien Bien Phu finally
crushed public support in France for the war; within three months,
a ceasefire and withdrawal were agreed (see Martin Windrow, The
Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French defeat in Vietnam [Orion,
2005]).
East Asia, West Asia
Three obvious comparisons can be drawn
between Indochina and Afghanistan. First, the seasonal nature of
both conflicts (in Indochina the fighting was intense during the
winter dry season and far less during the summer monsoons; in
Afghanistan, the snows limit warfare in winter, so most fighting is
done in spring and summer). Second, the Vietminh had opposed the
Japanese and the French, so were experienced in fighting foreign
enemies long before the Americans emerged to try to subdue them; in
the same way, the Taliban can be regarded as inheriting the mantle
of the fighters who defeated the forces of the mighty British
empire in the 19th century, as well as successors of the
anti-Soviet mujahideen of the 1980s. Third, the Vietminh had help
from the Chinese communists across the border, just as the Taliban
have ample support in western Pakistan.
In addition to his weekly openDemocracy
column, Paul Rogers writes an international security monthly
briefing for the Oxford Research Group; for details, click here
Paul Rogers's most recent book is Why We're Losing the War on
Terror (Polity, 2007) - an analysis of the strategic misjudgments
of the post-9/11 and why a new security paradigm is needed
There are also significant differences.
The Taliban do not have a political leader of the power of Ho Chi
Minh, nor a military commander with the quite extraordinary
capabilities of General Vo Nguyen Giap. The asymmetry of their
forces with Nato's may be even greater than with the respective
sides in Vietnam (even if the alliance pleads shortages of
helicopters and other equipment). Yet the recent experience of the
anti-Soviet struggle, the emergence of a new generation of military
commanders, and - perhaps above all - the mobilisation of
centuries-old memories of opposition to foreign occupations, are
potent weapons in the Taliban armoury.
The heart grown tired
In balancing always inexact historical
analogies against always singular current circumstances, caution is
in order. Yet there is another relevant factor that may indicate
the direction of the deeper current of events in Afghanistan:
whether Nato can maintain the will to continue to fight and build
in Afghanistan for the many years that may be necessary. Three
current news items are relevant in this respect.
The first reports a claim that British
forces in southern Afghanstan have killed as many as 7,000 Taliban
- and no less than 6,000 of them since January 2007 (see Michael
Smith, "Army Has Killed 7000 Taliban", Sunday Times, 13 April
2008). The human costs of this carnage are grave enough, but
leaving that aside it might be assumed that the figure is regarded
as a sign of military success. Not so: the story reflects an
intelligent recognition that deaths on this scale "are a boost for
the Taliban when fighters recruited from the local population are
killed, as the dead insurgent's family then feels a debt of honour
to take up arms against British soldiers." The assessment, put
bluntly, is that killing Taliban makes even more enemies.
The second news item indicates a
recognition in the Pentagon that troop numbers in Afghanistan are
inadequate for the task assigned to them, as Taliban militias seek
to avoid open conflict with well-armed Nato forces and move to
operate in areas where Nato is largely absent (see Jonathan S
Landay, "U.S. Seeking Troops To Send to Afghanistan", Miami Herald,
16 April 2008). The Pentagon is seeking 7,000 more troops to
supplement the 3,200 United States marines that have been deployed
in early 2008 (and are due to return by the year's end, with no
replacements yet identified. Even in these circumstances, most Nato
allies will not agree to increase their forces.
The small prospect of troop withdrawals
from Iraq was still alive until the upsurge in violence there -
reflected in the mood of the senatorial hearings of David H
Petraeus and Ryan C Crocker, and the statement of George W Bush on
10 April 2008 - effectively killed it (see "A war of decades", 10
April 2008). Thus the combination of military overstretch and a
lack of Nato solidarity means that the United States is facing
conflicts in two areas without the forces it believes it needs.
The third report concerns the level of US
casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan (reflected in new figures
released by the Pentagon that barely registered in the media). The
US military death-toll in the two main wars is now 4,492; but at
least as significant is the huge number of wounded, together with
the troops evacuated back to the United States because of
accidental injury or mental of physical illness (see Pia Malbran,
"Military Releases High Casualty Figures", CBS News, 14 April
2008). The number of those injured in combat now runs to 31,590,
and another 38,631 have been returned to the United States for
non-combat problems. Some of the latter may have been withdrawn for
routine treatment or tests; but the great majority are, at the very
least, indirect casualties of war.
Furthermore, a increasing proportion of
recent veterans has been reporting to the department of veterans'
affairs (DVA) for treatment, frequently for problems originating
during active service. The DVA had treated 299,585 from January
2002 to January 2008, 120,049 (40% of the total) for mental-health
disorders.
These three stories together portray a
very different picture of the strategic predicament of the United
States and its allies in Afghanistan (and Iraq) from the optimistic
comments of Brigadier-General Carlos Branco - and perhaps a more
accurate one. In 1954, the French gave up in the face not just of
"external" pressure and setback but of an "inner" corrosion of
their resolve. Nato in general and the United States in particular
may not yet be at that point: but they face wars that could stretch
for decades, and - whether or not they suffer an Afghan or Iraqi
equivalent of Dien Bien Phu - their opponents are expecting their
hearts eventually to fail.
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